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Addiction is driven by excessive goal-directed drug choice
under negative affect: translational critique of habit and
compulsion theory
Lee Hogarth 1
Drug addiction may be a goal-directed choice driven by excessive drug value in negative affective states, a habit driven by strong
stimulus−response associations, or a compulsion driven by insensitivity to costs imposed on drug seeking. Laboratory animal and
human evidence for these three theories is evaluated. Excessive goal theory is supported by dependence severity being associated
with greater drug choice/economic demand. Drug choice is demonstrably goal-directed (driven by the expected value of the drug)
and can be augmented by stress/negative mood induction and withdrawal—effects amplified in those with psychiatric symptoms
and drug use coping motives. Furthermore, psychiatric symptoms confer risk of dependence, and coping motives mediate this risk.
Habit theory of addiction has weaker support. Habitual behaviour seen in drug-exposed animals often does not occur in complex
decision scenarios, or where responding is rewarded, so habit is unlikely to explain most human addictive behaviour where these
conditions apply. Furthermore, most human studies have not found greater propensity to habitual behaviour in drug users or as a
function of dependence severity, and the minority that have can be explained by task disengagement producing impaired explicit
contingency knowledge. Compulsion theory of addiction also has weak support. The persistence of punished drug seeking in
animals is better explained by greater drug value (evinced by the association with economic demand) than by insensitivity to costs.
Furthermore, human studies have provided weak evidence that propensity to discount cost imposed on drug seeking is associated
with dependence severity. These data suggest that human addiction is primarily driven by excessive goal-directed drug choice
under negative affect, and less by habit or compulsion. Addiction is pathological because negative states powerfully increase
expected drug value acutely outweighing abstinence goals.
Neuropsychopharmacology (2020) 0:1–16; https://doi.org/10.1038/s41386-020-0600-8
BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF ADDICTION
Scientific and clinical theories seek to explain why addicts
continue to take drugs despite experiencing consequential harms.
This paper evaluates evidence for just three accounts of addiction
—goal-directed choice under negative affect, habit and compul-
sion—to try and determine which mechanism plays the most
important role in addiction. A brief summary of the broad scope of
addiction theory follows [1], to place these three accounts in
context.
Withdrawal-based negative reinforcement accounts argue that
although euphoric drug effects maintain initial use, growth in the
adverse withdrawal syndrome drives persistent drug use [2–4].
The self-medication account specifies psychiatric symptoms,
which increase during abstinence, as the main driver of
persistent drug use [5]. Although individual sensitivity to a
multidimensional withdrawal syndrome and other negative
states is associated with problematic substance use, there
remains debate as to which component of withdrawal is most
important [6], how this relates to psychiatric comorbidity [7, 8],
and whether negative states prime drug seeking automatically
[9] or via value-based decision making [10, 11]. This work forms
the basis of the goal-directed choice under negative affect
account evaluated at length later.
Positive reinforcement theories, by contrast, argue that the
excessively rewarding effects of drugs drive persistent drug use
independently of the withdrawal syndrome [12–15]. The
challenge for positive reinforcement theories is to explain why
drug use persists when addicts claim the drug has lost its value
[16]. To solve this contradiction, a range of secondary processes
have been postulated wherein drug seeking becomes less
controlled. Theories that appeal to appetitive Pavlovian con-
ditioning, for instance, argue that the pairing of drug cues with
drug reward endows drug cues with capacity to elicit drug
seeking, and sensitivity to this effect may underpin dependence
[1, 17–20], because cue-reactivity is automatic [21], or because
drug cues signal the accessibility (and hence greater utility) of
the drug in the presence of drug cues [22, 23]. However, drug
cue-reactivity is not reliably associated with dependence severity
in humans [24–27], suggesting this mechanism probably does
not underpin addiction.
Other positive reinforcement accounts have argued drug-
seeking behaviour becomes involuntary (or ‘crystalized’ [28]) with
practice. These theories argue that drug cues, or contexts, or the
completion of a prior link in a drug seeking chain, elicit drug
seeking ‘automatically’ in the sense of not being determined by
drug craving [29], or ‘habitually’ in the sense of not being
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determined by an expectation of the current value of the drug
[30], or ‘compulsively’ in the sense that costs associated with drug
seeking are discounted and do not impinge on the behaviour
[31, 32]. The habit and compulsion models are evaluated at
length later.
Neurocognitive versions of positive reinforcement theory claim
that although drug reward drives greater drug use, the persistence
of this behaviour in addicted individuals is driven by acquired
dysfunction in decision-making capacity. These accounts differ in
focus. Addiction could be driven by global impairments in
cognitive function [33], loss of volume/function of the prefrontal
cortex and other brain regions [34], specific impairments in
inhibitory control [35], or specific narrowing of temporal horizon
such that future costs and benefits are not considered in decision
making [36]. It remains unclear to what extent these neurocog-
nitive dysfunctions can be methodologically isolated from each
other, and whether they play a causal/prospective role in
addiction or are non-functional consequences of drug exposure
[37]. These neurocognitive models will not be considered further
because there is insufficient space to do justice to this broad field.
The various theories for addiction are usually pitted against one
other on the assumption that only one mechanism can explain
addiction. However, multiple mechanisms could contribute
simultaneously. Furthermore, the underpinning mechanisms
could differ between individuals depending on developmental
pathway, constitution, risk and protective factors [38, 39], or
between drug classes, for example, stimulants vs. depressants [40],
or across types of behaviour, for example, drug seeking vs. drug
taking [41, 42]. However, methods do not exist to adequately
isolate the contribution of specific mechanisms to behaviour in
different conditions.
Box 1 defines the three theories of addiction evaluated in this
paper, alongside key methods used to test each theory in
laboratory animals and humans—providing a translational per-
spective. The methods used with each species are descriptively
similar and arguably tap the same theoretical mechanisms, but
multiple methodological differences make direct comparison
between species challenging. Despite these complications, the
weight of evidence does appear to provide converging transla-
tional support for the claim that addiction is primarily driven by
excessive goal-directed drug choice under negative affect, and to
a lesser degree by habit or compulsion.
IS ADDICTION PRIMARILY DRIVEN BY EXCESSIVE GOAL-
DIRECTED CHOICE UNDER NEGATIVE AFFECT?
Studies with laboratory animals
This section will consider animal studies that test whether
dependence vulnerability is due to greater expected drug value
driving goal-directed drug seeking, particularly in negative states
[43]. Drug value can be measured by giving laboratory animals a
mutually exclusive choice between a response that earns the
drug and a response that earns another reward such as food.
The proportion of drug choices quantifies the relative value of
the drug. Only some ‘vulnerable’ animals show preferential drug
choice [44–46]. Drug choice can be increased by extended drug
exposure [47, 48], and modified by manipulating the relative
magnitude, delay or effort associated with the two rewards
[49–59] and by the opportunity for social interaction [60, 61].
Thus, drug choice is modified by individual differences, and
multiple decision parameters relevant to that choice.
The claim that animals make goal-directed choices between
drug and food based on the expected relative value of the
rewards is supported by two lines of evidence. First, rats that
preferentially choose drug over food have a greater number of
neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), which selectively
activate prior to performance of the drug choice, as if the ramping
up of OFC neuronal activity is the genesis of the drug choice
Box 1: Definitions and methods of three addiction theories
Definitions
Theory 1—Goal-directed drug choice under negative affect
On this view, individuals differ in their experience of drug reward value, due to a
variety of constitutional risk factors. The frequency of goal-directed drug seeking
is driven by an expectation of drug value (determined by experienced value)
combined with knowledge of the voluntary behaviour necessary to obtain the
drug [8, 15, 297–299]. The second process is that for some users, negative states
(withdrawal, distress, pain, anxiety, depression etc.) are acutely mitigated by
drugs, enabling these negative states to powerfully raise expected drug value
(reflected in verbal ‘coping motives’), driving goal-directed drug seeking above
already elevated baselines [10, 11], acutely outweighing competing abstinence
goals [300].
Theory 2—Habit.
Drug seeking is initially goal-directed, but drug reinforcement progressively
strengthens the association between drug stimuli (S) and the drug-seeking
response (R), such that drug stimuli can elicit the drug-seeking response directly
through an S−R association, without retrieving an expectation of drug value [30].
Addiction is driven by an increased contribution of this S−R/reinforcement
mechanism to the control of drug seeking. Habit theory predicts that drug
seeking is controlled by the established S−R strength only so long as the
reinforcer is not re-experienced has having a different value. Once the reinforcer
is experienced as having a lower or higher value, this will change the strength of
the S−R association and the frequency of drug seeking will change accordingly
(i.e. habitual drug seeking is flexible, but requires experience of the changed
value of the drug to adapt).
Theory 3—Compulsion
Compulsion theory is akin to habit theory, except that the flexibility of drug seeking
is argued to be lost. As with habit theory, drug seeking is argued to be goal-directed
initially, and then transitions to become an S−R habit, but then in the third stage,
becomes a compulsion—a maladaptive habit where the S−R association
controlling drug seeking can no longer be modified by direct experience of the
drug reinforcer [31, 32]. Because compulsive drug seeking is controlled by the
established S−R association (and not by the S−R/reinforcement mechanism) drug
seeking is not modified by direct experience of the low value of the reinforcer and
so continues in perpetuity despite loss of value. This explains why drug seeking
persists even though drug use is directly experienced as harmful, because this does
not weaken the S−R association controlling drug seeking.
Methods
Stress-induced reinstatement in laboratory animals: In the reinstatement model,
laboratory animals are first trained to self-administer an addictive drug. The
response is then extinguished by omitting the drug, and responding declines. In
the reinstatement test, animals are exposed to stress vs. no-stress (manipulated
behaviourally or pharmacologically), and it is typically found that stress increases
(reinstates) drug self-administration [83].
Mood/stress-induced drug motivation in humans: Human drug users are exposed
to negative mood or stress induction via a range of methods (music, self-
referential statements, mood congruent words, public speaking, cold pressor,
heat pain, serial addition, video clips, guided imagery etc.), and contrasted to a
no-induction control condition (either between-subjects or counterbalanced
within-subjects). Drug motivation is measured post-induction via a range of
methods (craving, choice, consumption, cognitive bias, economic demand etc.). It
is typically found that drug motivation is increased in the induction vs. no-
induction condition (sometimes also relative to pre-induction), demonstrating
the ability of negative states to motivate drug seeking [7, 10, 301, 302].
The outcome-devaluation task in laboratory animals: Animals first learn an
instrumental response to produce an appetitive reward. The response could be
goal-directed (driven by an expectation of current reward value), or habitual
(driven directly by an S−R association). To test this, the reward is devalued (in
one group) by pairing it with lithium chloride-induced sickness or specific satiety
(in a separate context so that the test context is not paired with the devaluation
treatment). Then, at test, animals again have the opportunity to perform the
instrumental response in extinction (so experience of the reinforcer cannot
modify any S−R association controlling the response). The response is deemed
goal-directed in being controlled by an expectation of the current value of the
reward if the devalued group decreases responding in the extinction test. If they
do not show a devaluation effect, the response is deemed habitual in being
controlled directly by an S−R association. Four versions of this method have
been used to test whether drugs promote habitual behaviour, as outlined in the
text [30, 174–176].
The outcome-devaluation task in humans: Typically, participants learn that two
responses (R1 and R2) earn different rewarding outcomes (O1 and O2). One
outcome is then devalued by consumption to satiety or instructions that an
outcome is no longer available. Finally, choice between the two responses is
tested in nominal extinction (i.e. instructions that outcomes will not be signalled
until the end). A decrease in responding for the devalued outcome suggests
that the response is goal-directed in being controlled by an expectation of the
current value of the outcome. But if responding for the devalued outcome does
not decrease (relative to baseline, or non-devalued control group), then the
response is deemed habitual in being elicited directly by an S−R association
[111, 130, 199–203, 303].
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[62, 63]. The OFC also carries signals reflecting multiple dimen-
sions of rewards such as magnitude, effort, delay etc., suggesting
the OFC may be important in calculating the overall utility of
rewards [64]. Finally, although there is a question of homology
[65], the OFC plays a role in goal-directed decision making in
humans [66], which may translate to animals.
The second line of evidence comes from the outcome-
devaluation procedure used to determine whether behaviour is
goal-directed [67] (see Box 1). In one study [68], rats were trained
on a seeking-taking chain for cocaine before the taking lever was
extinguished. This manipulation immediately reduced perfor-
mance of the seeking response tested in extinction (in the
absence of the taking lever), suggesting the seeking response was
controlled by a goal-directed expectation of access to cocaine,
rather than an S−R association. So although drug seeking can be
goal-directed (see also [69–71]), as noted in the habit section,
most animal studies suggest it is habitual (see also [72]). It remains
unclear what the optimal parameters are for detecting goal-
directed vs. habitual drug-seeking behaviour [73].
The most important question is whether negative states such as
withdrawal and stress can motivate goal-directed drug seeking.
The key study testing this prediction [74] found that when shifted
to a state of heroin withdrawal, rats immediately increased their
heroin seeking in extinction, suggesting withdrawal raised the
expected value of heroin as a goal. Relatedly, other animal studies
have demonstrated that withdrawal or conditioned withdrawal
motivate drug vs. food choice, or reinstate drug self-administra-
tion, or activate negative emotional brain circuits. However, these
motivational effects may not necessarily be goal-directed, there
are several null effects to consider, and it is possible that the
motivational impact of withdrawal may differ between drug
classes [75–82].
The stress-induced reinstatement model has also produced
mixed support for the goal-directed account (see Box 1).
Behavioural and pharmacological stress induction procedures
reliably increase single lever drug seeking and taking in the
reinstatement model [83, 84]. Furthermore, sensitivity to this effect
is increased by various ‘vulnerability’ factors: specifically, long vs.
short access to drugs [85–88]; adolescent vs. adult onset of drug
exposure [89, 90]; oestrous cycle [91]; individual heterogeneity
[92]; protracted withdrawal [93]; and baseline anxiety level at test
[94]. This work suggests that sensitivity to negative-affect-driven
drug seeking may play a role in vulnerability to dependence [95].
However, it is not clear whether stress augments drug seeking by
raising the expected value of the drug, or through a more
automatic form of control [96]. Furthermore, a wide range of non-
stress variables prompt reinstatement suggesting it may be a
noisy index of emotional control of behaviour [97]. Finally, one
study has found that yohimbine-induced stress did not increase
drug over food choice (Ahmed et al., personal communication
2019). In sum, the studies reviewed here provide suggestive but
preliminary evidence that drug seeking in laboratory animals can
be goal-directed in some conditions, that withdrawal (and
possibly stress) may motivate goal-directed drug seeking, and
that individual variation in this motivational effect could underpin
dependence vulnerability. However, more work is needed to
convincingly determine that addiction in laboratory animals is
driven by excessive goal-directed drug choice under negative
affect.
Human studies
This section will consider human evidence that drug dependence
is associated with excessive goal-directed drug choice, especially
under negative affect. Dependence symptom severity is consis-
tently associated with greater economic demand (willingness to
pay) for drugs, in both non-clinical [98–100] and clinical samples
[101–103]. Economic drug demand also predicts treatment
outcomes [99, 104], and drug consumption [105], and is increased
by withdrawal [106, 107], stress induction [108], impulsivity [109],
depression, anxiety [110] and schizophrenia [102]. To the extent
that drug demand reflects expected drug value, these studies
support the claim that goal-directed drug seeking increases with
dependence and negative affect states (withdrawal, stress
induction, psychiatric symptoms).
Excessive drug value indexed in human concurrent choice tasks
is also associated with dependence. Participants make forced
choices between drug and natural reinforcer over a series of trials.
Different designs use points for rewards [111, 112], pictures of
rewards [7, 113–117] or consumption of rewards [14, 118–124].
Preferential drug choice is reliably associated with the severity of
dependence to heroin [125], cocaine [116, 117, 126, 127], alcohol
[10, 15, 26, 112, 113, 115], and tobacco [15, 111, 114, 124, 128].
These associations have been found in both clinical
[15, 113, 114, 116, 117, 125–127] and non-clinical samples
[10, 26, 111–113, 115, 128]. Percent drug choice also increases
with latency to relapse [129], abstinence [7], depression and
anxiety symptoms and self-reported drinking to cope with
negative affect [10, 15, 113, 115], and is decreased by health
warnings and satiety [111, 130, 131], by raising the magnitude of
the alternative reward [14, 112, 118, 121, 132–134], and by
increasing the effort [59], and delay of the drug choice
[112, 133, 134]. Thus, like economic demand, concurrent choice
tasks index drug value, and this is increased in individuals with
dependence and associated psychiatric risk factors.
The crucial question is whether drug choice is goal-directed as
opposed to automatic. In support of the goal-directed account,
drug choice is immediately reduced in extinction by decreasing
the value of the drug via satiety [11, 111, 135], pharmacotherapy
[130] and health warnings [111, 135], indicating that drug choice is
goal-directed (see outcome-devaluation task in Box 1). The
implication is that preferential drug choice in dependent
individuals is controlled by greater expected drug value.
Crucially for the theoretical model, goal-directed drug choice
has also been augmented by negative affect induction in two
studies. In the first study, smokers were trained on a concurrent
choice task to earn tobacco and food points, before tobacco was
devalued by specific satiety [11]. Participants then completed
either a negative or positive mood induction procedure before
choice was measured again in extinction. For participants in the
positive mood induction group, satiety decreased goal-directed
tobacco choice as expected [111, 135]. By contrast, participants in
the negative mood induction group who reported an increase in
The two-stage task in humans: In each trial, selecting one stimulus from the first-
stage pair produces a ‘common’ and ‘rare’ second-stage pair with a 70:30
probability, respectively. If the other stimulus from the first-stage pair is selected,
the probabilities of the second-stage pairs are reversed. Selecting a second-stage
stimulus pays an amount that varies slowly over trials independently for each
stimulus. Payoff is maximised by learning the transitional structure between
stages and which second-stage stimulus currently pays most. The goal-directed
(model-based) vs. habitual (model-free) status of responding is determined by
the choice of first-stage stimulus following a trial where a stimulus from the rare
second-stage pair paid most. Goal-directed participants will choose the other
first-stage stimulus than they chose in the previous trial, giving a 70% chance of
producing the same second-stage pair as the previous trial, to access the second-
stage stimulus that paid most. By contrast, habitual participants will choose the
same first-stage stimulus as they chose on the previous trial because that
previous trial was reinforced, even though this choice gives only a 30% chance of
producing the same second-stage pair as the previous trial. In short, the task
measures whether participants make choices using knowledge of the transitional
structure between stages, or simply repeat choices that paid off in the previous
trial [229, 233, 278–281].
Shock punishment of self-administration in laboratory animals: Animals are first
trained on a drug self-administration schedule (or seeking-taking chain, where an
initial response is required to access the self-administration lever). After training,
the self-administration response is punished by foot shock to quantify the
decrease in responding relative to baseline and/or a no-punishment group.
Compulsivity is indexed by less shock suppression of self-administration
[60, 197, 283–295].
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negative mood actually increased their goal-directed tobacco
seeking, despite smoking satiety. The implication is that negative
mood is a powerful motivational state driving goal-directed
tobacco seeking that can outweigh the primary motivational state
of satiety. In the second study, alcohol drinkers were trained on a
concurrent choice task for alcohol and food points before being
tested in extinction with a negative or positive affect statement
read at random prior to each choice [10]. Negative affect
statements primed an increase in goal-directed alcohol choice,
relative to positive statements and baseline, in participants who
reported drinking to cope with negative affect. The implication is
that negative affect augments goal-directed drug choice, and this
effect is magnified in those who are constitutionally predisposed
to use drugs to cope with negative affect.
Other studies have demonstrated that, in vulnerable individuals,
mood/stress induction has a greater priming effect on drug
motivation measured by pictorial drug choice, craving, economic
demand and consumption. The stress-induced increase in drug
craving predicts risk of relapse in alcohol [136–139] and cocaine-
dependent individuals [140, 141], suggesting this sensitivity is a
core mechanism in addiction. Mood/stress-induced drug motiva-
tion is also amplified in individuals who self-report using drugs to
cope with negative affect [10, 115, 125, 136, 137, 142–149], in
smokers with depression symptoms [7, 150], young adult drinkers
with depression symptoms [10] and alcohol-dependent men with
anxiety symptoms [137]. Individual sensitivity to mood-induced
drug seeking also correlates with withdrawal-induced drug
seeking suggesting a common mechanism [7]. Importantly
however, although alcohol dependence has been associated with
greater mood/stress-induced drug motivation in some studies
[147, 151–153], a sizable number of other studies have reported
null associations [10, 113, 115, 137, 143, 146, 148, 149, 154]. The
implication is that although dependence severity is associated
with preferential goal-directed drug choice, negative affect-
induced priming of drug motivation is predominantly linked to
psychiatric symptoms and drug use coping motives, and this
second process may represent the unique additional risk factor
that drives addiction in those with psychiatric comorbidities and
subclinical psychiatric symptoms.
Psychiatric symptoms, abuse/trauma history and associated
drug use to cope with negative affect are major prospective risk
factors for the development and persistence of drug dependence
[155–173]. Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, self-reported drug
use to cope with negative affect mediates the relationship
between psychiatric/abuse/trauma severity and dependence
severity, in a wide range of clinical and subclinical groups.
Although the majority of studies listed in Table 1 are cross-
sectional, precluding causal inferences, they nevertheless strongly
support the hypothesis that drug dependence in a wide range of
vulnerable groups is driven by excessive goal-directed drug choice
under negative affect.
IS ADDICTION DRIVEN BY HABIT LEARNING?
According to habit theory of addiction [30, 32], repeated experience
of drug reward progressively strengthens the stimulus−response
(S−R) association between drug stimuli and the drug seeking
responses, such that drug stimuli become able to elicit drug seeking
directly, without an expectation of the drug and its current value.
Thus, drug seeking becomes less susceptible to voluntary control
and decision making [30, 32]. The outcome-devaluation and two-
stage procedures are the key sources of evidence for the habit
account, and these studies are reviewed now.
Studies with laboratory animals
Outcome-devaluation designs testing habit theory of addiction in
animals fall into four categories. In the most compelling designs,
animals learn that two responses earn drug and food in separate
sessions. Then, in separate tests, each outcome is devalued and
response rate for the devalued outcome is measured in extinction.
Four such designs have found that the drug-seeking response
does not decrease from baseline following devaluation, suggest-
ing the behaviour is not goal-directed (controlled by expected
outcome value), but is an S−R habit elicited by drug paired
contextual stimuli [30, 174–176]. The food-seeking response, by
contrast, is reduced by devaluation, indicating that it is goal-
directed. These four studies provide the core empirical basis for
the claim that drug seeking as opposed to natural reward seeking
(in laboratory animals) is especially prone to habitual control.
In the second design, animals are chronically exposed to a drug
(experimenter administered or consumed in the home cage), and
then trained on a single lever for food. Food is then devalued, and
the food-seeking response is tested in extinction. Eight such studies
have shown that, at test, food seeking is insensitive to devaluation
(habitual) in drug-exposed animals and sensitive to devaluation
(goal-directed) in non-drug-exposed animals [69, 177–183], although
three studies reported null group differences [184–186]. The
implication is that chronic drug exposure renders reward seeking
prone to habitual control, producing general behavioural autonomy.
However, it is not clear how habitual natural reward seeking would
lead to drug dependence.
In the third design, animals are trained on a single lever for
drug, and sensitivity to devaluation is tested after minimal vs.
extended training. Three studies have demonstrated that the
drug-seeking response is initially goal-directed but then becomes
habitual with extended training [69–71]. However, because food
seeking also transitions from goal-directed to habitual control with
training in animals [187] (not replicated in humans [188]), these
findings do not inform us about the unique habit forming
potential of drug seeking.
In the fourth design, animals are trained on a single lever for
drug and tested for sensitivity to devaluation following a fixed
amount of training. These studies have revealed drug seeking to
be both goal-directed [68, 74], and habitual [189], so do not inform
us about the unique habit forming potential of drug seeking.
There are two main criticisms of the animal outcome-devaluation
model. First, habitual instrumental behaviour is generally only found
when animals have access to a single lever in each session
([190, 191] but for one exception see [30]). By contrast, it is
commonly found that when rats have concurrent access to two
levers for different rewards in each session, drug seeking remains
goal-directed [73], food seeking remains goal-directed despite
chronic drug exposure [184, 192], and food seeking remains goal-
directed despite extended training [193–196]. If one accepts that
human drug users’ natural environment offers a multitude of
responses for different rewards, then it must be concluded that
habitual behaviour seen in the animal model has minimal ecological
validity and likely does not play a major role in human addictive
behaviour [197, 198].
The second criticism is that habitual control is fragile because
sensitivity to devaluation is immediately restored in reacquisition
tests where drug seeking produces the devalued reinforcer. This
restoration of sensitivity to devaluation in reacquisition tests is found
for both drug seeking [30, 174–176] and food seeking in chronically
drug-exposed animals [180, 181]. If one accepts that in human drug
users’ natural environment, extinction conditions rarely occur, but
conditions comparable to reacquisition prevail (i.e. drug seeking is
typically reinforced), then it must be concluded that the habitual
behaviour seen exclusively in the extinction test of the animal model
has limited ecological validity and likely does not play a major role in
human addictive behaviour.
Human studies
Table 2 summarises outcome-devaluation studies conducted with
human drug users to test habit theory. There have been 11 tests
published in 7 papers [111, 130, 199–203]. A scan of the ‘Support
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for habit theory’ column indicates that these tests yield an 8 to 3
ratio of evidence against habit theory. Additionally, the analysis
below indicates that the three positive tests can be explained by
general task disengagement producing impaired explicit knowl-
edge of task contingencies, rather than a specific propensity to
habit learning.
All the studies in Table 2 used an outcome-devaluation task in
which there was a concurrent choice between two responses that
earned different rewards. These rewards could be points for tobacco,
food, soft drinks, or money plus a specific outcome picture, shock or
aversive noise. Outcomes were then devalued by specific satiety, by
instructing participants that outcome pictures would not earn
money points, or by disconnecting the shock or noise. Finally,
participants were tested for choice between responses in extinction.
If participants show reduced choice of the response that led to the
now devalued outcome, they are goal-directed, but if they do not
reduce choice of the devalued outcome, they are habitual.
Habit theory predicts that the effect of devaluation on choice at
test should be reduced in drug users vs. controls, and/or as a
function of dependence severity in the user group, demonstrating
a propensity to habit. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 summarise
evidence for these predictions. Tests numbered 1–8 provide no
evidence for habit theory, in that the devaluation effect was not
reduced in the drug user group or as a function of dependence
severity. This failure to support habit theory was found in both
clinical (tests 5–8) and non-clinical samples (1–4). Furthermore, the
failure to support habit theory cannot be attributed to the use of
concurrent choice procedures (which tend to discourage habitual
learning as noted earlier) because all of the tests in Table 2 used
concurrent choice procedures, both those that failed (test 1–8)
and those that notionally supported habit theory (test 9–11).
In those tests that supported habit theory (tests 9–11), the drug
user group or more dependent users also showed impaired
explicit knowledge of the contingencies operating in the task, in
addition to weaker devaluation performance. Indeed, column
7 shows a perfect correspondence between impaired explicit
contingency knowledge and impaired devaluation performance.
In numerous human learning tasks, explicit knowledge of task
contingencies is necessary for accurate performance, that is,
participants who have impaired contingency knowledge perform
less accurately in these tasks [204–209]. The implication is that
drug users, or more dependent users, failed to acquire explicit
contingency knowledge in the three tests supporting habit theory
(tests 9–11), which impaired their devaluation performance,
making them appear to be habitual. Drug users have general
deficits in cognition or motivation that underpin their perfor-
mance deficits in wide range of tasks [37, 210–212]. Arguably, this
general deficit in cognition or motivation produced general task
disengagement that impaired explicit contingency knowledge
and thereby impaired devaluation performance. In other words,
impaired devaluation performance is probably not driven by a
specific propensity to habit learning or deficit in goal-directed
control but by general task disengagement.
It is important to note that drug users’ deficit in explicit
contingency knowledge extended to knowledge of stimulus
−response (S−R), response−outcomes (R−O) and stimulus−out-
come (S−O) contingencies. Thus, it cannot be claimed that drug
users were specifically impaired in learning about outcomes
important for goal-directed action, as has sometimes been
claimed [201, 213]. For example, the supplemental material for
test 10 [203] states that: “Compared with control volunteers, CUD
[cocaine dependent participants] demonstrated significant deficits
in explicit knowledge in terms of stimulus-outcome … response-
outcome … and stimulus-response … relationships”. Similarly, in
test 11 [201], “Strong evidence was obtained for a negative
association between FTND scores [nicotine dependence severity
in smokers] and explicit knowledge on stimulus–response…
and stimulus–outcome associations”. Furthermore, hierarchical
multiple regression analysis suggested that weaker knowledge of
the stimulus–outcome contingencies explained the relationship
between nicotine dependence severity and weaker devaluation
performance, leading the authors to conclude that “habitual
responding in severely dependent smokers may be the result of
compromised goal-directed learning”. However, because this
specific impairment in stimulus−outcome knowledge was not
found consistently across the three studies supporting habit
theory, this conclusion cannot be maintained. Indeed, test 9 [202]
did not publish the explicit contingency knowledge data, but later
analysis of these data (reported in the supplementary materials of
the current paper) found less accurate explicit knowledge of
stimulus−response contingencies in alcohol dependent vs.
control participants—the very knowledge that should be impor-
tant for habit learning. In sum, all three studies showing impaired
devaluation performance also showed impaired explicit contin-
gency knowledge suggesting that the apparent evidence for habit
could be explained by general task disengagement perhaps
driven by a general cognitive impairment [37, 210–212].
The idea that devaluation performance could be disrupted by
general cognitive impairment is supported by ‘cognitive load’
studies in humans and animals. These studies have found that
devaluation performance can be impaired by stress [214–219],
acute alcohol administration [220], an alcohol consumption
expectancy [135], being placed in drug-related contexts
[221, 222], and sleep deprivation [223]. Furthermore, devaluation
performance is impaired in a range of neuropsychiatric conditions
including social anxiety [224, 225], autism spectrum disorder [225],
schizophrenia [226], Parkinson’s disease [227], obsessive compul-
sive disorder [213], impulsivity [199], and in young children [228].
The generality of the devaluation deficit suggests it stems from
general motivational or cognitive impairments, and is not the
unique mechanism underpinning addiction.
A similar analysis may be applied to the two-stage task (see
Box 1 for a description of the methods). The results of these
studies are summarised in Table 3. There have been nine tests of
whether model-based (goal-directed) learning is impaired or
model-free (habit) learning is increased in drug users vs. controls
(column 4), or as a function of dependence severity in the user
group (column 5). Of the nine tests, only four claimed evidence for
habit theory (although one of these was one-tailed and the group
difference was not significant when a confound in cognitive speed
was controlled [229]). Crucially, none of the studies measured
participants’ explicit knowledge of the task contingencies.
Consequently, it is unknown whether the four studies reporting
evidence for habit theory can be explained by impaired
contingency knowledge (as was the case with the outcome-
devaluation procedure). However, it is known that model-based
learning can be increased by adding incentives (points) for
accurate performance [230], and impaired by a working memory
load manipulation [231], and is impaired in individuals with lower
working memory capacity [232], and lower cognitive speed
[233, 234]. These findings suggest that the four two-stage studies
that reported evidence for habit theory may be attributed to
general motivational/cognitive deficit in drug users or as a
function of dependence severity, rather than a specific propensity
to habit learning or deficit in goal-directed control. To quote one
two-stage paper [233]: “whether reduced model-based control in
patients constitutes a disease-specific mechanism or results from
general cognitive impairments can only be teased apart in future
longitudinal studies”.
IS ADDICTION DRIVEN BY COMPULSION (INSENSITIVITY TO
PUNISHMENT)?
Studies with laboratory animals
One of the major problems with habit theory noted earlier is that
sensitivity to devaluation is restored immediately when responses
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produce the devalued reinforcer, so habit could not explain the
persistence of drug seeking in the human natural environment. To
negate this theoretical dilemma, it has been proposed that drug
seeking is controlled by compulsion, defined as “a maladaptive
stimulus-response habit” [31], and “as the maladaptive persistence
of responding despite adverse consequences” [32] (it should
be noted that other researchers use the term compulsion to mean
a wide range of processes which are not considered here because
they are difficult to test empirically [198]). The principal assay of
compulsivity is the persistence of punished drug seeking. The
problem, however, is that persistence of punished drug seeking
can equally be explained by excessive value ascribed to the drug,
outweighing the punisher [43]. Unique evidence for the compul-
sion model relies on demonstrating that persistence of punished
drug seeking is not associated with excessive valuation of the
drug in another assay. Early studies presented preliminary support
for this dissociation between assays, but later studies that have
employed more sensitive measures of drug value have indicated
that persistence of punished drug seeking is associated with
greater valuation of the drug, undermining the core behavioural
evidence for compulsion theory.
Table 4 summarises studies that have measured the suppres-
sion of drug self-administration by shock punishment (the
putative assay of compulsivity), and drug value in a second assay
(e.g., self-administration frequency, breakpoints in progressive
ratio tasks, persistence under extinction, and preferential choice of
drug vs. natural reward). Studies reporting a dissociation between
these two assays (column 5) support compulsion theory by
suggesting that persistence under punishment cannot be
explained by greater drug value. By contrast, studies reporting a
correlation between these two assays contradict compulsion
theory by suggesting that persistence under punishment may be
due to greater drug value. Column 5 indicates that four studies
support compulsion theory, and 11 studies support drug value
theory. Overall, the evidence favours drug value over compulsion
theory as an explanation for the persistence of punished drug
seeking. One speculation is that vulnerable animals persist under
punishment not because they are insensitive to costs, but because
the punisher motivates drug self-administration in the following
period to self-medicate. If this is true, then persistence of punished
drug seeking could be another example of excessive goal-directed
drug seeking under negative affect, not an example of
compulsion.
Human studies
Human studies designed to test whether dependence is
associated with insensitivity to costs (cost discounting) have also
provided minimal evidence for compulsion theory. Demand tasks
measure the amount of drug participants would hypothetically
consume across increasing prices (costs). The intensity of demand
(maximum consumption at low price) is considered to be a
relatively pure index of drug value unaffected by costs. By
contrast, breakpoint—the price at which drug consumption drops
to zero—is thought to be more sensitive to the impact of price
costs on the decision to consume. Compulsion theory would be
supported if dependence severity was more strongly associated
with breakpoint than intensity, suggesting cost insensitivity is
more important than drug value [235–237]. However, meta-
analyses and systematic reviews of this literature have found that
proxies for dependence correlate more consistently with measures
of intensity than breakpoint [238–241], suggesting that depen-
dence is more likely to be driven by greater drug value than cost
discounting. However, one key study found that student drinkers
with a family history of alcoholism were less sensitive to the effect
of imagined next-day responsibilities on reducing alcohol demand
[242], supporting the notion that dependence vulnerability may
be linked to discounting costs imposed on alcohol. It remains to
be seen what explains this discrepancy.T
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Deficits in reversal learning have been interpreted as evidence
for greater cost discounting in addiction. In reversal learning tasks,
participants learn that one response has a higher payoff than an
alternative choice, before these response−reward contingencies
are reversed. Drug users show deficits in reversal learning despite
comparable acquisition of the initial contingencies [35, 243–245]
(for similar findings with laboratory animals see [246, 247]). One
interpretation is that drug users are less sensitive to the
punishment of the incorrect choice, driving persistence of this
choice. However the effect could also be due to impaired
prediction error coding, cognitive inflexibility, or general task
disengagement [35]. Reversal learning deficit therefore do not
provide compelling evidence for cost discounting in addiction.
A recent study directly tested whether alcohol dependence was
associated with discounting delay and opportunity costs imposed on
alcohol seeking [112]. Student drinkers (n = 127, who varied in
alcohol dependence symptom severity) made concurrent forced
choices between alcohol and food points under conditions that
manipulated the magnitude of points and the delay to receive
points. Alcohol value was indexed by preferential choice of alcohol
vs. food, whereas sensitivity to costs was indexed by the decrease in
alcohol choice when food points were of greater magnitude
(sensitivity to opportunity costs) and when alcohol points were
delayed (sensitivity to delay costs). It was found that alcohol use
disorder symptom severity was associated with increased alcohol
choice indicating greater value of alcohol, but not with sensitivity to
opportunity or delay costs imposed on the alcohol choice. This paper
provided further evidence that dependence is driven by greater
value ascribed to drugs, and not with greater discounting of costs
imposed on drugs, i.e. compulsion theory was not supported.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The paper reviewed studies with laboratory animal and humans
that tested whether addiction is driven by excessive goal-directed
drug choice under negative affect, habit, or compulsion. There
was substantial support for the first account, and limited support
for the latter two. Animal studies supporting the excessive goal
account found that drug choice was associated with dependence
vulnerability, can be modulated by multiple decision parameters,
is subserved by the OFC decision-making centre, and is goal-
directed. However, there was only indirect suggestive evidence
that negative states such as withdrawal and stress motivate drug
seeking via a goal-directed mechanism, and that this effect might
be amplified in vulnerable animals. This area needs more
attention, back-translating human findings. Human studies, by
contrast, supported the excessive goal account by demonstrating
that economic drug demand increases with dependence, psy-
chiatric symptoms, and stress induction. Similarly, concurrent drug
choice is demonstrably goal-directed, is modulated by decision
parameters, and increases with dependence, psychiatric symp-
toms, and mood/stress induction, and this latter effect is amplified
in individuals who report psychiatric symptoms and drug use to
cope with negative affect, and in those at greater risk of
relapse. Finally, psychiatric symptoms, abuse/trauma history, and
coping motives confer prospective risk of dependence, and
coping motives mediate this risk. These data provide converging
translational (and longitudinal) evidence that addiction is primarily
driven by excessive goal-directed drug choice under negative
affect, although evidential gaps do need to be addressed.
By contrast, the evidence for habit theory is weak, suggesting
that this psychological process does not play a major role in
human addiction. Only four animal studies showed that drug
seeking is especially prone to habit, and although eight studies
showed that drug exposure renders reward seeking habitual, it is
unclear how this would drive dependence. Habitual behaviour is
also abolished when animals are given a choice, and when
responses are rewarded, and so could not explain human
addictive behaviour in the natural environment where these
conditions prevail. In humans, most studies found no evidence
for habitual behaviour in drug users vs. controls, or as a function
of dependence. The three studies supporting habit theory
showed a correspondence between impaired devaluation
performance and impaired explicit contingency knowledge.
Furthermore, deficits in devaluation performance have been
found with a wide range of ‘cognitive load’ manipulations and
psychiatric symptom states, suggesting a general effect pro-
duced by task disengagement. Finally, only the minority of
studies using two-stage tasks supported habit theory, and these
could also be explained by task disengagement. Collectively the
studies provide minimal evidence for a specific propensity to
habit or impairment in goal-directed control as a major factor
controlling human addiction.
The evidence for compulsion theory is also weak. In animals, the
primary index of compulsivity—persistence of punished drug
seeking in vulnerable animals—is most often associated with greater
drug value indexed in a separate assay. The implication is that
persistence of punished drug seeking is not due to insensitivity to
costs imposed on drug seeking (compulsivity), but due to excessive
value of the drug. Human studies have similarly found minimal
evidence that dependence is associated with cost discounting in
economic demand tasks, reversal learning tasks or concurrent choice
tasks where costs are imposed on the drug choice.
The overall conclusion from this translational analysis is that
addiction is primarily driven by excessive goal-directed drug
choice under negative affect, and much less by habit or
compulsion. This conclusion accords with other negative reinfor-
cement models of addiction [3, 9, 248], except that in the current
model, negative states enhance the expected value of the drug
driving goal-directed drug choice [10, 11, 74], rather than priming
drug seeking automatically as is commonly claimed [9]. Addiction
is pathological not because it is automatic, but because negative
states powerfully drive up expected drug value acutely out-
weighing other goals such as a job, abstinence, family and health,
resulting in a return to drug use despite wishes to the contrary
expressed at other times.
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